Revisiting a Classic: Los Macheteros by Ronald Fernandez

Rally in San Juan in honor of Filiberto.

Los Macheteros is an exemplary work of journalism. Ronald Fernandez immersed himself in investigating what was to become the largest bank robbery in the U.S. In doing so, Fernandez unknowingly discovered the radicals behind the bank robbery, the illegal battle being waged by the FBI against them, and the historical, political and culture battle at the center of the struggle for Puerto Rican independence. The book isn’t just about how a poor, low paid Well’s Fargo security guard, Victor Manuel Gerena Ortiz, expertly stole $7 million, but how Victor’s act was part of a larger guerrilla battle being waged in Puerto Rico against American colonialism. Fernandez’ quest to understand the guerrilla movement led him to the jungles of Puerto Rico. By doing this he was able to prove his credentials and was later introduced to militants of Los Macheteros, but not in Puerto Rico, instead right in his hometown of Hartford, CT, in the belly of the beast. Los Macheteros captures the instant when the struggle for Puerto Rican independence was forced into the national political discussion. More telling, however, Los Macheteros encapsulates the struggle being waged for a free Puerto Rico and its abilty to withstand the test of time and repression.

            On September 12^th, 1983 Well’s Fargo employee, Victor Gerena, forced his coworkers to put hoods over their heads and bound them together. “To oversee $30 million in West Hartford, the company paid $4.75 an hour.” (p. 3). What followed would lead FBI detectives into a three-decade long chase for the conspirers. Fernandez captures how the FBI refused to believe that a 25 year old Puerto Rican could successfully pull off a bank robbery. In fact, according to attorney Michael Graham, the FBI had nothing else to do but to “declare war on an innocent family” who in reality did not know anything about Victor’s whereabouts, even less, about the secretly planned robbery (41). September 12^th happens to also be the birthday of the founder of the Puerto Rican independence movement, Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos, a fact that would later become an integral part to linking Los Macheteros to the robbery. But who were Los Macheteros? And why were they targeting a bank in Hartford, Connecticut? Los Macheteros, also known as Ejercito Popular Boricua, were the successors to the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquenas (FALN), a paramilitary group founded by the late Filiberto Ojeda Rios, whose strategy for independence was to attack symbols of American dominance in Puerto Rico. Fernandez sums up the struggle the militant group faced:

Los Macheteros were up against eighty-eight years of American dominance and, as if that wasn’t a challenge enough, they were seeking to establish a sense of pride in youngsters who had never been to the island…what the group offered was self-esteem via participation in a meaningful movement. And to kids exposed to prejudice, kids called “spics”, Los Macheteros offered a way to fight back. (p107)

West Hartford was home to a large population of Puerto Ricans, the majority of which migrated from New York City to work in the Tabaco Industry. However, after the collapse of that industry in the early 1970’s, the living situation for most Puerto Ricans declined, most either returned to New York City or took up low paying and unstable jobs in West Hartford’s service sector. This fact would prove to make the initial investigation on Victor’s whereabouts difficult, as the majority of Puerto Rican’s in West Hartford overwhelmingly supported his actions. In fact, it wasn’t until Victor Gerena began writing letters to the local papers that the police began to broaden the scope of their investigation and reach out to the FBI in Puerto Rico.

Student's of the UPR protesting against attempts to raise tuition and police presence on campus.

Fernandez chronicles the battles between the FBI and Los Macheteros in Puerto Rico prior to the 1983 bank robbery. In fact, Los Macheteros had already robbed a smaller amount of money from Well’s Fargo several years earlier in the island.  The confrontation between the police and Los Macheteros were cemented after the massacre of Cerro Maravilla in July 25^th, 1978. The massacre took place after two independistas surrendered during an attempt to blow up a communications tower. This further proved to militant independistas the need to have an efficient and disciplined revolutionary military unit. The main act of violence carried out by Los Macheteros, which started the hunt against them was the December 17^th, 1979 ambush of a Navy bus in Sebana Seca, which resulted in the killing of two U.S. sailors. The battle between the U.S. and the Puerto Rican government took the conventional form of arms fighting, but also entailed a super active counterintelligence operation against Los Macheteros and anyone who was deemed to be “too radical”, as was the case with Carlos Noya Murati. Carlos was a prominent member of the leftwing Puerto Rican Socialist League, and after being wrongly subpoenaed, he twice refused to take an oath of allegiance to a country he did not recognize, resulting in jail time. Los Macheteros, like other Latin American guerrilla movements have a Maoist ideological background. However, they’re to be differentiated from guerrilla groups like Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) whose origins arise from that country’s lack of an agrarian reform and whose founders were firm Marxist believers.  In the case of Los Macheteros, the struggle is less about an economic model, and more about the struggle for an independent nation in an “occupied” country. Thus, Los Macheteros also fought to preserve a Puerto Rican identity and culture, a fact that Fernandez’ paints elegantly. In West Hartford, several months after the robbery the group sent hundreds of toys to be distributed to children in the Puerto Rican communities during the celebration of Los Reyes Magos, usually a week after the new year. Not only were Los Macheteros trying to win sympathy, but also they were invigorating their claims to be an organization fighting to protect a Puerto Rican identity. An identity they felt has always been under attack. Under this same light, Victor Genera began sending teasing letters to Hartford detectives, under the more Latin American name, Victor Manuel Gerena Ortiz. His letters included messages of solidarity to the Puerto Rican community and to the Latino community in general. 

Victor Gerena received a decent share of support in Hartford after his daring robbery. Nonetheless, Los Macheteros as an organization did not share the same similar support. Fernandez argues part of the problem, historically, has been the inability of the independistas to connect the two issues of an impoverished state and the islands status as a colony. In other words, economic issues like unemployment or crime were not treated as part of the broad problem of being a colony whose identity culturally and economically speaking has been tied to interests from the north. In a survey quoted by Fernandez, 51% of Puerto Ricans viewed Los Macheteros as a terrorist organization whose goals and actions are unacceptable (p236).  This is part of the reason why Los Macheteros remain such a clandestine organization. Another reason why they also remain marginalized is the ferocity for which the U.S. has pursued nationalists. Fernandez outlines head of the CIA J. Edgar Hoover view in the 1960’s:

Hoover suggested that, to undermine the dangerous current of nationalism, the following tactics be employed: the use of informants to disrupt the movement and create dissension within the groups…the use of handwritten letters to plant the seeds of suspicion between various factions…the use of anonymous mailings concerning Puerto Rico’s relationship with the U.S. to be sent to subjects within the independence movement who might be psychologically affect by such information…(157).

The U.S. has always been wary of nationalist figures; especially those that seek to organize in the states. Which is why the fact that Victor Gerena still remains at large, (presumably in Cuba) is an alarming one for the authority’s image. Since the killing of Filiberto Ojeda Rios in 2005, and the 1999 pardoning by President Bill Clinton of various machetero militants Los Macheteros as an organization have been virtually silent.

            The struggle for a free Puerto Rico has taken up several of fronts, from political parties, to mass militant parties and to underground guerrilla organizations. The ideas of freedom, that is, to be identified as a Puerto Rican, and to make decisions for Puerto Rico, based on the will of its citizens, will forever foment the idea of independence. In the last decade we have seen Puerto Rico in deep class struggle, in the front lines are the Puerto Rican Teacher’s Federation (FMPR) and the students of the University of Puerto Rico (UPR). Sadly, Ronald Fernandez is no longer here with us to be able to chronicle the ongoing struggles being waged in Puerto Rico and it’s consequences and actions of solidarity here in the states.  

Bibliography:

Fernandez, Ronald. Los Macheteros: The Wells Fargo Robbery and the Violent Struggle for Puerto Rican Independence. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987, Print.

Santos and FARC begin peace talks in Oslo

Humberto de la Calle and Co.

Colombia peace negotiations have begun in Oslo today. Humberto de la Calle, represents the Colombian government, which arrived to Oslo yesterday with “hope...moderate optimism”. On the side of the FARC is Luciano Marín Arango, alias Ivan Márquez.  Other FARC representatives include Simon Trinidad, who is currently serving a 60 year sentence for kidnapping in the U.S., and Dutch national Tanja Nijmeijer, who joined in 2000 and is wanted by both the U.S. and the EU.

 After 50 years of civil war, this is the fourth time since 1980 that peace negotiations have been tried. However, the difference between these negotiations is the focus on content, as opposed to simply territorial control and/or ceasefire. Luis Eduardo Garzón, a former communist and now Colombia’s minister of social dialogue, who is involved in the peace process says “I am optimistic now because ... this president has set a concrete agenda,”. The five issues on the agenda in Oslo are listed:

1) rural and land development
2) guarantees for political participation
3) drug trafficking
4) the rights of the victims
5) end of the armed conflict

Negotiations are coming at a moment when the FARC has found itself in the defensive in the last decade, especially since the implementation of “Plan Colombia”. This blog has always argued that “Plan Colombia” is a military free trade agreement. In other words, doing war with the FARC is a business doctrine; and “Plan Colombia” was the privatization of that business to the U.S. In the last 12 years since its inception, the FARC have gone from an 18,000 strong unit that controlled a third of the country, to numbering at 8,000 and controlling only marginal sections of the Colombian jungle and small towns near the border of Ecuador and Venezuela respectively. The deaths of top FARC leaders including Raul Reyes in 2008, Manuel Marulanda in 2008 (heart attack), Mono Jojoy in 2010, and Alfonso Cano in 2011, has severely crippled the old guard leadership of the FARC.

Simon Trinidad

In the economic sphere, Colombia has found itself desperately trying to become the second C of the “BRIC” nations. Colombia’s GDP expanded 4.9% inthe second quarter of 2012, partially led by the booming oil and coal industry, whose profits have risen on the fact that Colombians pay 8,000 pesos a gallon ($4).  Unemployment hovers at 10%, one of the highest in South America. New tax codes discussed in congress this week is attempting to tackle inequality. The plan is to exempt the lowest of income earners from paying income taxes. Colombia, compared to other Latin American nations, is one of the most unequal. Colombia's macroeconomic solution has been to continue opening its door to international investment, specifically; President Juan Manuel Santos has been keen to bringing in Chinese investments (infrastructure), much to the concern of the U.S. Obviously, solving the civil war puzzle would be a huge boosts to investments and international credit ratings.

But not all sections of the ruling elite of Colombia are in agreement with the peace process. Ex-president Alvaro Uribe has spoken out against the Santos administration for "dealing with terrorists". Meanwhile media outlets like RCN and Caracol have spoken on the peace negotiations in a belittling demeanor. This should come as no surprise, there is a split in the ruling class of Colombia on which way forward for capital and economic development. One section sees peace with the guerrillas and a diversification of the economy, i.e. a deeper relationship with China and Brasil, as a top priority. The other section, personified by Uribe and Co. are the hardliners who see the economic, political and social advantage of being at "war with terrorists" and who primarily see the U.S. as their main trading partner. 

Late 2011, students protest "education reform" in Bogota.

The outcome of the negotiations at Oslo, assisted by Cuba, Venezuela and Chile, will prove to be a deciding factory on President Santos' legacy. It will also dictate on how millions of Colombians will be able to live their lives. Peace will help rebuild a much needed left in Colombia. In a country where anything left-of-center is attacked as "chavista", getting rid of the bogey man "FARC", is crucial in the building of new left, a left that to date has been led by political leaders like Piedad Cordoba, Antonio Navarro and Gustavo Petro and by student activists in Bogota and Cali, who last year led militant marches confronting Santos' attempt at further privatizing education. 

Chavez wins yet again

Hugo Chavez wins yet again, deepening his quest for "Socialism in the 21st century". His opponent, former oligarch, turned leftt-centrist, Henrique Capriles, was forced to admit the election was free and fare, something most Venezuelan gusanos couldn't admit. Venezuela could teach the world on how to improve bourgeois democracy with their e-voting system. Chavez' win doesn't mean an automatic deepening of the socialist project, the danger is that he remains the only leader of the PSUV. Recognizable leaders need to be created, however this doesn't come out of thin air, but the PSUV can do more to create that beginning layer of cadre. More troublesome is the bureaucracy formed around his government. The emphasis needs to be on grassroots activism in the working poor and self involvement of ordinary Venezuelan on the day-to-day business of running Venezuela, starting with organizing basic needs in the neighborhood, active involvement in administrating healthcare, and more active union and worker participation in key industries. Orlando Chirino, presidential candidate for the Partido Socialismo y Libertad, runs on that platform. Nonetheless, in a country that has every right to be wary of foreign intervention we must view a victory for Hugo Chavez as a rightful defeat for  U.S. imperialism, the Venezuelan comprador class and the newly emerging Venezuelan gusano class in the states. The future leaders of the Venezuelan socialist project needs to be formed, from the bottom up.