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| The dictator Porfirio Diaz |
The phenomenon of U.S. involvement in other countries’ affairs is long and meticulous, particularly in Latin America. U.S. leaders have historically struggled to balance their economic interests abroad while also attempting to promote their core beliefs of freedom, liberty and free market capitalism. The balancing act is between advocating and representing a set of ideals versus using any means possible to protect and in fact expand U.S. corporate dominance. The two tasks aren’t handled in separate political or military arenas; instead the economic hegemony of the U.S. takes precedence and forms part of a unifying policy of the U.S. ruling establishment. A modern day example of such unifying policies would be the doctrine of “regime change” exemplified by former U.S. president G.W. Bush or the idea of “humanitarian intervention” implemented by former president W. Clinton in the Balkans and president B. Obama in Libya. These modern day doctrines have their roots in the implementation of the Roosevelt Corollary (to the Monroe Doctrine) which established the idea that the U.S. has the right to intervene in Latin America and warning European powers not to intervene. South America is the continent in which the U.S. first realized its potential to be a superpower. It provided many first time situations for the U.S., in particular with the Mexican Revolution where it posed the following dilemma: relating to an authentic revolutionary upsurge that has the possibility of uprooting the economic bases in which the U.S. stands.
The U.S. ruling establishment was fundamentally tied to the Mexican Revolution. Business was the primary concern not merely geography; in 1911, the annual volume of trade between the two was 117 million dollars, additionally the U.S. had invested over one billion dollars to promote economic development, this was more than all European countries combined and made up a quarter of all U.S. foreign investments (1). Most of this money was concentrated on the railroad and extractive industries that were crucial to the U.S. economy (2). With this in mind the U.S.’s attitude towards Latin America was presented in president W. Wilson’s “Declaration of Policy in regards to Latin America”:
Cooperation is only possible when supported at every turn by the orderly process of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force…We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. (3)
These words were presented during the Mexican Revolution and it highlights an important theme for the U.S. establishment in regards to Mexico before and after the revolution; the long-term stability in the economic and social realm. Seeing Mexico as a strategic trading partner, the U.S. couldn’t afford it to be in constant political and social turmoil, especially if it directly affected investments. The “Declaration in Regards to Latin America” policy as articulated by W. Wilson was not about declaring war on dictators, after all the U.S. had just supported Mexico’s most ruthless, Porfirio Diaz, for decades. The declaration was more concerned about leaders, elected or not elected, who by their actions and inactions continued to foment social unrest. Moreover, the argument that the U.S. will stand by governments that promote the orderly process was untenable to the Mexican Revolution. Revolution is not an orderly process, it is the involvement of the immense majority of a population into the realm of politics and decision-making, and this is sometimes very disorderly. It is for this reason the deciding factor for U.S. support of a political leader in Mexico before and after the revolution was not for one who had the correct ideas but for one who could provide a functioning business climate.
At turn of the 20th century Mexico was in the process of becoming an industrialized nation, led by the ruthless dictator Porfirio Diaz. Diaz was able to modernize Mexico’s economy, creating a class of industrialists, extremely rich landowners and state administrators around him called cientificos. In turn, Mexico’s working class was vastly growing in size and the number of landless peasants expanded as well. The vast majority of Mexicans did not have an opportunity for political or economic advancement. An even though at this time Mexico’s economy was booming, the gains were mostly directed to the people in the Diaz regime. In 1910, a revolt by different social classes, and with different goals and means to arrive to it, united to bring down the Diaz regime. The various forces included landless peasants fighting for agrarian reform, led by Emiliano Zapata in the south and Francisco “Pancho” Villa in the North, social democrats led by the martyred president Francisco Madero, aspiring military men like Alvaro Obregon, and reformist landowners/governors like Venustiano Carranza. These popular figures all fought for a different type of Mexico, and challenged, albeit in various degrees, the different counterrevolutions that arose throughout the years 1910-1920, starting with the remnants of the Diaz regime and the counterrevolutionary forces of Madero’s assassin Victoriano Huerta.
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| The revolutionary Francisco "Pancho" Villa |
The U.S. was playing a balancing act by promoting the virtues of democracy and at the same time trying to make sure economic stability was maintained. At the same time it actively tried to engage with Mexico’s revolutionary process. The first strategy adopted by Washington under Woodrow Wilson, was of “watchful waiting”. As the term implies it included “neutrality between Huerta and the rebels in the hinterlands of Mexico and the establishment of an arms embargo against…government and revolutionary” (4). This was a tactical shift away from former president Taft’s position, which sought to give political legitimacy to Huerta’s coup against the democratically elected Madero. The reasoning that Wilson gave was presented in his “Declaration of Policy in Regards to Latin America” quoted above. Moreover, Wilson understood that the conditions that gave rise to the revolution in Mexico still existed, and in fact was being exacerbated by Huerta’s counterrevolution. Contrary to what Huerta would have wanted the U.S. to believe, i.e. Mexico was now in “peace and prosperity”, and Wilson understood that there was a fierce power struggle still being waged and that Huerta was likely to fall. However, the struggle was in a stalemate, still not having produced a clear victor, which the U.S. needed to relate to in order to help sustain or even co-opt the leadership.
One potential victorious leader that the U.S. established close links to was with the renegade general Pancho Villa. Not only because of his activities on the border and his principle of protecting U.S. property but also because of his affective ability to lead an army, in particular, primarily responsible for defeating Huerta’s army. It is also true that the mass media portrayal of Villa as a “Mexican Robin Hood” and his socialist demands gave him broad public support abroad (5). The Wilson administration was willing to look the other way in light of Villa’s harsh treatment of Spaniards in Mexico and during the Benton affair, when Villa’s men killed a prominent Englishman living in Mexico, because it understood that Villa’s army was the most superior and that his demands of equal distribution of the land represented the aspiration of ordinary Mexicans (6). Eventually in 1914, this led to the lifting of the arms trade embargo in favor of Carranza and Villa, ending the passive sentiment of the “watchful waiting” approach. Pancho Villa was politically savvy. He understood more than any other leader in Mexico that without U.S. cooperation the task of coming to power would be impossible. He also understood that inter-imperialist rivalries were at play. Great Britain and Germany gave their political support to Huerta, seeing his regime as the only way to bring stability. Because of this, U.S. involvement was inevitable, thus Villa positioned himself to embrace such an action, going as far as advancing the idea that the U.S. control the whole port of Veracruz “so that even water could not get to Huerta” (7). U.S. involvement in fact did occur after the incident at Tampico between Huerta’s men and the U.S. navy. With the U.S. navy now in the picture the revolution was going to enter its decisive stage, and Huerta was going to experience defeat in the hands of the Constitutionalists.
The dilemma that arose for Wilson was that after Huerta’s resignation the governor of Coahuelia, Carranza, assumed the presidency. This was the default option, since Zapata in the south by principle did not want power, and both Obregon and Villa were too strained by their military expeditions. It was the logical conclusion for Wilson and the U.S. business class to align with Carranza. Not only did he unite the opposition against Huerta, but Carranza, unlike Villa and Zapata, was a trained and experienced politician, and a businessman at heart. Thus:
On October 9, 1915 Carranza’s government was recognized as the de facto government of Mexico. On the date Francisco Villa reverted to his original status of bandit and outlaw as far as the United State was concerned, The cycle seemed complete, but Villa was still a factor in the affairs of the two nations. (8)
Pancho Villa learned the hard way; an alliance with the U.S. should never be taken for granted. What resumed after Carranza’s rise to power was a struggle between Carranza’s right hand man, Alvaro Obregon, and the peasant armies of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. At this juncture, the U.S. firmly stood by Carranza, even though there relationship had been rocky in the past. It was also at this point in 1916-1917 that the U.S. became actively involved, with the Pershing Expedition, which sought to bring down Villa’s army in the north. The expedition was meant to stabilize the Carranza regime and more importantly to tame the most radical elements of the Mexican Revolution, the poor peasants and radical workers (9). The withdrawal of American troops from northern Mexico, worked out between General Obregon and General Scott, after Mexico pledged to protect the border, signified a new alignment of the ruling establishment in Mexico and the business class in the U.S. In fact, the election of Obregon to the presidency in 1919, coinciding with the assassination of both Zapata and Carranza in 1919 and 1920 respectively marks the end of the Mexican revolution.
The Mexican Revolution was the first mass revolutionary struggle of the 20th century. It brought down the Diaz dictatorship and brought to the political scene the masses. It also left a deep legacy in Mexico, and in fact all of Latin America; a legacy of agrarian reform, worker’s rights, and democracy. The U.S. and Wilson respected these virtues on paper, but vacillated between defending these ideas and protecting U.S. business. The Mexican Revolution was started, conducted and finished by Mexicans, but contrary to what historian John D. Eisenhower argues in his book Intervention, the involvement of U.S. forces and the tactical support it gave to certain leaders in distinct moments did play a crucial role (10). The “watchful waiting” approach allowed Huerta and Villa to continue battling it out, in the long-term depleting Villa’s forces. The Veracruz occupation, coordinated with the Carranza wing of the Constitutionalists, paved the way for the toppling of Huerta and in his place Carranza. Finally, the Pershing Expedition pacified Villa’s forces in the north, leaving the battle for power between the two trustworthy leaders Carranza and Alvaro Obregon. This isn’t to argue that the U.S. was behind every event in the revolution, but an attempt to put into a historical perspective the decisions presented to the Wilson administration, and to understand the method and the process of engaging a revolutionary upsurge that challenges the economic bases in which the U.S. stands. The flexibility in which Wilson tackled the day-to-day challenges that the revolution presented to U.S. business has become an outline for how U.S. foreign policy should be approached; principles aside, economics comes first.
Notes:
- Gilderhus, Mark. Democracy and Revolution: U.S.-Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1977, p 1.
- Gily, Adolfo. The Mexican Revolution. New Press, New York, NY, 2005, p 26.
- Eisenhower, John. Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution 1913-1917. Norton Company, New York, NY, 1993, p 33.
- Ibid., p 37.
- Ibid, p 54.
- Clendenen, Calrence. The United States and Pancho Villa: A study in Unconventional Diplomacy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1961, p 77.
- Ibid, p 84.
- Ibid, p 206.
- Haley, Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970, p 225.
- Eisenhower, p 328.
