Thursday, December 13, 2012

Revisiting a Classic: Los Macheteros by Ronald Fernandez

Rally in San Juan in honor of Filiberto.

Los Macheteros is an exemplary work of journalism. Ronald Fernandez immersed himself in investigating what was to become the largest bank robbery in the U.S. In doing so, Fernandez unknowingly discovered the radicals behind the bank robbery, the illegal battle being waged by the FBI against them, and the historical, political and culture battle at the center of the struggle for Puerto Rican independence. The book isn’t just about how a poor, low paid Well’s Fargo security guard, Victor Manuel Gerena Ortiz, expertly stole $7 million, but how Victor’s act was part of a larger guerrilla battle being waged in Puerto Rico against American colonialism. Fernandez’ quest to understand the guerrilla movement led him to the jungles of Puerto Rico. By doing this he was able to prove his credentials and was later introduced to militants of Los Macheteros, but not in Puerto Rico, instead right in his hometown of Hartford, CT, in the belly of the beast. Los Macheteros captures the instant when the struggle for Puerto Rican independence was forced into the national political discussion. More telling, however, Los Macheteros encapsulates the struggle being waged for a free Puerto Rico and its abilty to withstand the test of time and repression.

            On September 12th, 1983 Well’s Fargo employee, Victor Gerena, forced his coworkers to put hoods over their heads and bound them together. “To oversee $30 million in West Hartford, the company paid $4.75 an hour.” (p. 3). What followed would lead FBI detectives into a three-decade long chase for the conspirers. Fernandez captures how the FBI refused to believe that a 25 year old Puerto Rican could successfully pull off a bank robbery. In fact, according to attorney Michael Graham, the FBI had nothing else to do but to “declare war on an innocent family” who in reality did not know anything about Victor’s whereabouts, even less, about the secretly planned robbery (41). September 12th happens to also be the birthday of the founder of the Puerto Rican independence movement, Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos, a fact that would later become an integral part to linking Los Macheteros to the robbery. But who were Los Macheteros? And why were they targeting a bank in Hartford, Connecticut? Los Macheteros, also known as Ejercito Popular Boricua, were the successors to the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertorriquenas (FALN), a paramilitary group founded by the late Filiberto Ojeda Rios, whose strategy for independence was to attack symbols of American dominance in Puerto Rico. Fernandez sums up the struggle the militant group faced:
Los Macheteros were up against eighty-eight years of American dominance and, as if that wasn’t a challenge enough, they were seeking to establish a sense of pride in youngsters who had never been to the island…what the group offered was self-esteem via participation in a meaningful movement. And to kids exposed to prejudice, kids called “spics”, Los Macheteros offered a way to fight back. (p107)
West Hartford was home to a large population of Puerto Ricans, the majority of which migrated from New York City to work in the Tabaco Industry. However, after the collapse of that industry in the early 1970’s, the living situation for most Puerto Ricans declined, most either returned to New York City or took up low paying and unstable jobs in West Hartford’s service sector. This fact would prove to make the initial investigation on Victor’s whereabouts difficult, as the majority of Puerto Rican’s in West Hartford overwhelmingly supported his actions. In fact, it wasn’t until Victor Gerena began writing letters to the local papers that the police began to broaden the scope of their investigation and reach out to the FBI in Puerto Rico.
Student's of the UPR protesting against attempts to raise tuition and police presence on campus.
Fernandez chronicles the battles between the FBI and Los Macheteros in Puerto Rico prior to the 1983 bank robbery. In fact, Los Macheteros had already robbed a smaller amount of money from Well’s Fargo several years earlier in the island.  The confrontation between the police and Los Macheteros were cemented after the massacre of Cerro Maravilla in July 25th, 1978. The massacre took place after two independistas surrendered during an attempt to blow up a communications tower. This further proved to militant independistas the need to have an efficient and disciplined revolutionary military unit. The main act of violence carried out by Los Macheteros, which started the hunt against them was the December 17th, 1979 ambush of a Navy bus in Sebana Seca, which resulted in the killing of two U.S. sailors. The battle between the U.S. and the Puerto Rican government took the conventional form of arms fighting, but also entailed a super active counterintelligence operation against Los Macheteros and anyone who was deemed to be “too radical”, as was the case with Carlos Noya Murati. Carlos was a prominent member of the leftwing Puerto Rican Socialist League, and after being wrongly subpoenaed, he twice refused to take an oath of allegiance to a country he did not recognize, resulting in jail time. Los Macheteros, like other Latin American guerrilla movements have a Maoist ideological background. However, they’re to be differentiated from guerrilla groups like Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) whose origins arise from that country’s lack of an agrarian reform and whose founders were firm Marxist believers.  In the case of Los Macheteros, the struggle is less about an economic model, and more about the struggle for an independent nation in an “occupied” country. Thus, Los Macheteros also fought to preserve a Puerto Rican identity and culture, a fact that Fernandez’ paints elegantly. In West Hartford, several months after the robbery the group sent hundreds of toys to be distributed to children in the Puerto Rican communities during the celebration of Los Reyes Magos, usually a week after the new year. Not only were Los Macheteros trying to win sympathy, but also they were invigorating their claims to be an organization fighting to protect a Puerto Rican identity. An identity they felt has always been under attack. Under this same light, Victor Genera began sending teasing letters to Hartford detectives, under the more Latin American name, Victor Manuel Gerena Ortiz. His letters included messages of solidarity to the Puerto Rican community and to the Latino community in general. 
Victor Gerena received a decent share of support in Hartford after his daring robbery. Nonetheless, Los Macheteros as an organization did not share the same similar support. Fernandez argues part of the problem, historically, has been the inability of the independistas to connect the two issues of an impoverished state and the islands status as a colony. In other words, economic issues like unemployment or crime were not treated as part of the broad problem of being a colony whose identity culturally and economically speaking has been tied to interests from the north. In a survey quoted by Fernandez, 51% of Puerto Ricans viewed Los Macheteros as a terrorist organization whose goals and actions are unacceptable (p236).  This is part of the reason why Los Macheteros remain such a clandestine organization. Another reason why they also remain marginalized is the ferocity for which the U.S. has pursued nationalists. Fernandez outlines head of the CIA J. Edgar Hoover view in the 1960’s:
Hoover suggested that, to undermine the dangerous current of nationalism, the following tactics be employed: the use of informants to disrupt the movement and create dissension within the groups…the use of handwritten letters to plant the seeds of suspicion between various factions…the use of anonymous mailings concerning Puerto Rico’s relationship with the U.S. to be sent to subjects within the independence movement who might be psychologically affect by such information…(157).
The U.S. has always been wary of nationalist figures; especially those that seek to organize in the states. Which is why the fact that Victor Gerena still remains at large, (presumably in Cuba) is an alarming one for the authority’s image. Since the killing of Filiberto Ojeda Rios in 2005, and the 1999 pardoning by President Bill Clinton of various machetero militants Los Macheteros as an organization have been virtually silent.
            The struggle for a free Puerto Rico has taken up several of fronts, from political parties, to mass militant parties and to underground guerrilla organizations. The ideas of freedom, that is, to be identified as a Puerto Rican, and to make decisions for Puerto Rico, based on the will of its citizens, will forever foment the idea of independence. In the last decade we have seen Puerto Rico in deep class struggle, in the front lines are the Puerto Rican Teacher’s Federation (FMPR) and the students of the University of Puerto Rico (UPR). Sadly, Ronald Fernandez is no longer here with us to be able to chronicle the ongoing struggles being waged in Puerto Rico and it’s consequences and actions of solidarity here in the states.  
Bibliography:
Fernandez, Ronald. Los Macheteros: The Wells Fargo Robbery and the Violent Struggle for Puerto Rican Independence. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987, Print.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Santos and FARC begin peace talks in Oslo


Humberto de la Calle and Co.

Colombia peace negotiations have begun in Oslo today. Humberto de la Calle, represents the Colombian government, which arrived to Oslo yesterday with “hope...moderate optimism”. On the side of the FARC is Luciano Marín Arango, alias Ivan Márquez.  Other FARC representatives include Simon Trinidad, who is currently serving a 60 year sentence for kidnapping in the U.S., and Dutch national Tanja Nijmeijer, who joined in 2000 and is wanted by both the U.S. and the EU.
 After 50 years of civil war, this is the fourth time since 1980 that peace negotiations have been tried. However, the difference between these negotiations is the focus on content, as opposed to simply territorial control and/or ceasefire. Luis Eduardo Garzón, a former communist and now Colombia’s minister of social dialogue, who is involved in the peace process says “I am optimistic now because ... this president has set a concrete agenda,”. The five issues on the agenda in Oslo are listed:

1) rural and land development
2) guarantees for political participation
3) drug trafficking
4) the rights of the victims
5) end of the armed conflict


Negotiations are coming at a moment when the FARC has found itself in the defensive in the last decade, especially since the implementation of “Plan Colombia”. This blog has always argued that “Plan Colombia” is a military free trade agreement. In other words, doing war with the FARC is a business doctrine; and “Plan Colombia” was the privatization of that business to the U.S. In the last 12 years since its inception, the FARC have gone from an 18,000 strong unit that controlled a third of the country, to numbering at 8,000 and controlling only marginal sections of the Colombian jungle and small towns near the border of Ecuador and Venezuela respectively. The deaths of top FARC leaders including Raul Reyes in 2008, Manuel Marulanda in 2008 (heart attack), Mono Jojoy in 2010, and Alfonso Cano in 2011, has severely crippled the old guard leadership of the FARC.

Simon Trinidad
In the economic sphere, Colombia has found itself desperately trying to become the second C of the “BRIC” nations. Colombia’s GDP expanded 4.9% inthe second quarter of 2012, partially led by the booming oil and coal industry, whose profits have risen on the fact that Colombians pay 8,000 pesos a gallon ($4).  Unemployment hovers at 10%, one of the highest in South America. New tax codes discussed in congress this week is attempting to tackle inequality. The plan is to exempt the lowest of income earners from paying income taxes. Colombia, compared to other Latin American nations, is one of the most unequal. Colombia's macroeconomic solution has been to continue opening its door to international investment, specifically; President Juan Manuel Santos has been keen to bringing in Chinese investments (infrastructure), much to the concern of the U.S. Obviously, solving the civil war puzzle would be a huge boosts to investments and international credit ratings.

But not all sections of the ruling elite of Colombia are in agreement with the peace process. Ex-president Alvaro Uribe has spoken out against the Santos administration for "dealing with terrorists". Meanwhile media outlets like RCN and Caracol have spoken on the peace negotiations in a belittling demeanor. This should come as no surprise, there is a split in the ruling class of Colombia on which way forward for capital and economic development. One section sees peace with the guerrillas and a diversification of the economy, i.e. a deeper relationship with China and Brasil, as a top priority. The other section, personified by Uribe and Co. are the hardliners who see the economic, political and social advantage of being at "war with terrorists" and who primarily see the U.S. as their main trading partner. 

Late 2011, students protest "education reform" in Bogota.
The outcome of the negotiations at Oslo, assisted by Cuba, Venezuela and Chile, will prove to be a deciding factory on President Santos' legacy. It will also dictate on how millions of Colombians will be able to live their lives. Peace will help rebuild a much needed left in Colombia. In a country where anything left-of-center is attacked as "chavista", getting rid of the bogey man "FARC", is crucial in the building of new left, a left that to date has been led by political leaders like Piedad Cordoba, Antonio Navarro and Gustavo Petro and by student activists in Bogota and Cali, who last year led militant marches confronting Santos' attempt at further privatizing education. 

Friday, October 12, 2012

Chavez wins yet again

Hugo Chavez wins yet again, deepening his quest for "Socialism in the 21st century". His opponent, former oligarch, turned leftt-centrist, Henrique Capriles, was forced to admit the election was free and fare, something most Venezuelan gusanos couldn't admit. Venezuela could teach the world on how to improve bourgeois democracy with their e-voting system. Chavez' win doesn't mean an automatic deepening of the socialist project, the danger is that he remains the only leader of the PSUV. Recognizable leaders need to be created, however this doesn't come out of thin air, but the PSUV can do more to create that beginning layer of cadre. More troublesome is the bureaucracy formed around his government. The emphasis needs to be on grassroots activism in the working poor and self involvement of ordinary Venezuelan on the day-to-day business of running Venezuela, starting with organizing basic needs in the neighborhood, active involvement in administrating healthcare, and more active union and worker participation in key industries. Orlando Chirino, presidential candidate for the Partido Socialismo y Libertad, runs on that platform. Nonetheless, in a country that has every right to be wary of foreign intervention we must view a victory for Hugo Chavez as a rightful defeat for  U.S. imperialism, the Venezuelan comprador class and the newly emerging Venezuelan gusano class in the states. The future leaders of the Venezuelan socialist project needs to be formed, from the bottom up.

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

A Historical Analysis: U.S. Involvement in the Mexican Revolution

The dictator Porfirio Diaz

The phenomenon of U.S. involvement in other countries’ affairs is long and meticulous, particularly in Latin America. U.S. leaders have historically struggled to balance their economic interests abroad while also attempting to promote their core beliefs of freedom, liberty and free market capitalism. The balancing act is between advocating and representing a set of ideals versus using any means possible to protect and in fact expand U.S. corporate dominance. The two tasks aren’t handled in separate political or military arenas; instead the economic hegemony of the U.S. takes precedence and forms part of a unifying policy of the U.S. ruling establishment. A modern day example of such unifying policies would be the doctrine of “regime change” exemplified by former U.S. president G.W. Bush or the idea of “humanitarian intervention” implemented by former president W. Clinton in the Balkans and president B. Obama in Libya. These modern day doctrines have their roots in the implementation of the Roosevelt Corollary (to the Monroe Doctrine) which established the idea that the U.S. has the right to intervene in Latin America and warning European powers not to intervene. South America is the continent in which the U.S. first realized its potential to be a superpower. It provided many first time situations for the U.S., in particular with the Mexican Revolution where it posed the following dilemma: relating to an authentic revolutionary upsurge that has the possibility of uprooting the economic bases in which the U.S. stands.
            The U.S. ruling establishment was fundamentally tied to the Mexican Revolution. Business was the primary concern not merely geography; in 1911, the annual volume of trade between the two was 117 million dollars, additionally the U.S. had invested over one billion dollars to promote economic development, this was more than all European countries combined and made up a quarter of all U.S. foreign investments (1). Most of this money was concentrated on the railroad and extractive industries that were crucial to the U.S. economy (2). With this in mind the U.S.’s attitude towards Latin America was presented in president W. Wilson’s “Declaration of Policy in regards to Latin America”:
Cooperation is only possible when supported at every turn by the orderly process of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force…We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. (3)
These words were presented during the Mexican Revolution and it highlights an important theme for the U.S. establishment in regards to Mexico before and after the revolution; the long-term stability in the economic and social realm.  Seeing Mexico as a strategic trading partner, the U.S. couldn’t afford it to be in constant political and social turmoil, especially if it directly affected investments. The “Declaration in Regards to Latin America” policy as articulated by W. Wilson was not about declaring war on dictators, after all the U.S. had just supported Mexico’s most ruthless, Porfirio Diaz, for decades. The declaration was more concerned about leaders, elected or not elected, who by their actions and inactions continued to foment social unrest. Moreover, the argument that the U.S. will stand by governments that promote the orderly process was untenable to the Mexican Revolution. Revolution is not an orderly process, it is the involvement of the immense majority of a population into the realm of politics and decision-making, and this is sometimes very disorderly. It is for this reason the deciding factor for U.S. support of a political leader in Mexico before and after the revolution was not for one who had the correct ideas but for one who could provide a functioning business climate.
At turn of the 20th century Mexico was in the process of becoming an industrialized nation, led by the ruthless dictator Porfirio Diaz. Diaz was able to modernize Mexico’s economy, creating a class of industrialists, extremely rich landowners and state administrators around him called cientificos. In turn, Mexico’s working class was vastly growing in size and the number of landless peasants expanded as well. The vast majority of Mexicans did not have an opportunity for political or economic advancement. An even though at this time Mexico’s economy was booming, the gains were mostly directed to the people in the Diaz regime. In 1910, a revolt by different social classes, and with different goals and means to arrive to it, united to bring down the Diaz regime. The various forces included landless peasants fighting for agrarian reform, led by Emiliano Zapata in the south and Francisco “Pancho” Villa in the North, social democrats led by the martyred president Francisco Madero, aspiring military men like Alvaro Obregon, and reformist landowners/governors like Venustiano Carranza. These popular figures all fought for a different type of Mexico, and challenged, albeit in various degrees, the different counterrevolutions that arose throughout the years 1910-1920, starting with the remnants of the Diaz regime and the counterrevolutionary forces of Madero’s assassin Victoriano Huerta.
The revolutionary Francisco "Pancho" Villa
            The U.S. was playing a balancing act by promoting the virtues of democracy and at the same time trying to make sure economic stability was maintained. At the same time it actively tried to engage with Mexico’s revolutionary process. The first strategy adopted by Washington under Woodrow Wilson, was of “watchful waiting”. As the term implies it included “neutrality between Huerta and the rebels in the hinterlands of Mexico and the establishment of an arms embargo against…government and revolutionary” (4). This was a tactical shift away from former president Taft’s position, which sought to give political legitimacy to Huerta’s coup against the democratically elected Madero. The reasoning that Wilson gave was presented in his “Declaration of Policy in Regards to Latin America” quoted above. Moreover, Wilson understood that the conditions that gave rise to the revolution in Mexico still existed, and in fact was being exacerbated by Huerta’s counterrevolution. Contrary to what Huerta would have wanted the U.S. to believe, i.e. Mexico was now in “peace and prosperity”, and Wilson understood that there was a fierce power struggle still being waged and that Huerta was likely to fall. However, the struggle was in a stalemate, still not having produced a clear victor, which the U.S. needed to relate to in order to help sustain or even co-opt the leadership.
            One potential victorious leader that the U.S. established close links to was with the renegade general Pancho Villa. Not only because of his activities on the border and his principle of protecting U.S. property but also because of his affective ability to lead an army, in particular, primarily responsible for defeating Huerta’s army. It is also true that the mass media portrayal of Villa as a “Mexican Robin Hood” and his socialist demands gave him broad public support abroad (5). The Wilson administration was willing to look the other way in light of Villa’s harsh treatment of Spaniards in Mexico and during the Benton affair, when Villa’s men killed a prominent Englishman living in Mexico, because it understood that Villa’s army was the most superior and that his demands of equal distribution of the land represented the aspiration of ordinary Mexicans (6). Eventually in 1914, this led to the lifting of the arms trade embargo in favor of Carranza and Villa, ending the passive sentiment of the “watchful waiting” approach. Pancho Villa was politically savvy. He understood more than any other leader in Mexico that without U.S. cooperation the task of coming to power would be impossible. He also understood that inter-imperialist rivalries were at play. Great Britain and Germany gave their political support to Huerta, seeing his regime as the only way to bring stability. Because of this, U.S. involvement was inevitable, thus Villa positioned himself to embrace such an action, going as far as advancing the idea that the U.S. control the whole port of Veracruz “so that even water could not get to Huerta” (7). U.S. involvement in fact did occur after the incident at Tampico between Huerta’s men and the U.S. navy. With the U.S. navy now in the picture the revolution was going to enter its decisive stage, and Huerta was going to experience defeat in the hands of the Constitutionalists.
The dilemma that arose for Wilson was that after Huerta’s resignation the governor of Coahuelia, Carranza, assumed the presidency. This was the default option, since Zapata in the south by principle did not want power, and both Obregon and Villa were too strained by their military expeditions. It was the logical conclusion for Wilson and the U.S. business class to align with Carranza. Not only did he unite the opposition against Huerta, but Carranza, unlike Villa and Zapata, was a trained and experienced politician, and a businessman at heart. Thus:
On October 9, 1915 Carranza’s government was recognized as the de facto government of Mexico. On the date Francisco Villa reverted to his original status of bandit and outlaw as far as the United State was concerned, The cycle seemed complete, but Villa was still a factor in the affairs of the two nations. (8)
Pancho Villa learned the hard way; an alliance with the U.S. should never be taken for granted. What resumed after Carranza’s rise to power was a struggle between Carranza’s right hand man, Alvaro Obregon, and the peasant armies of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata. At this juncture, the U.S. firmly stood by Carranza, even though there relationship had been rocky in the past. It was also at this point in 1916-1917 that the U.S. became actively involved, with the Pershing Expedition, which sought to bring down Villa’s army in the north. The expedition was meant to stabilize the Carranza regime and more importantly to tame the most radical elements of the Mexican Revolution, the poor peasants and radical workers (9). The withdrawal of American troops from northern Mexico, worked out between General Obregon and General Scott, after Mexico pledged to protect the border, signified a new alignment of the ruling establishment in Mexico and the business class in the U.S. In fact, the election of Obregon to the presidency in 1919, coinciding with the assassination of both Zapata and Carranza in 1919 and 1920 respectively marks the end of the Mexican revolution.
            The Mexican Revolution was the first mass revolutionary struggle of the 20th century. It brought down the Diaz dictatorship and brought to the political scene the masses. It also left a deep legacy in Mexico, and in fact all of Latin America; a legacy of agrarian reform, worker’s rights, and democracy. The U.S. and Wilson respected these virtues on paper, but vacillated between defending these ideas and protecting U.S. business. The Mexican Revolution was started, conducted and finished by Mexicans, but contrary to what historian John D. Eisenhower argues in his book Intervention, the involvement of U.S. forces and the tactical support it gave to certain leaders in distinct moments did play a crucial role (10). The “watchful waiting” approach allowed Huerta and Villa to continue battling it out, in the long-term depleting Villa’s forces. The Veracruz occupation, coordinated with the Carranza wing of the Constitutionalists, paved the way for the toppling of Huerta and in his place Carranza. Finally, the Pershing Expedition pacified Villa’s forces in the north, leaving the battle for power between the two trustworthy leaders Carranza and Alvaro Obregon. This isn’t to argue that the U.S. was behind every event in the revolution, but an attempt to put into a historical perspective the decisions presented to the Wilson administration, and to understand the method and the process of engaging a revolutionary upsurge that challenges the economic bases in which the U.S. stands. The flexibility in which Wilson tackled the day-to-day challenges that the revolution presented to U.S. business has become an outline for how U.S. foreign policy should be approached; principles aside, economics comes first.  

Notes:

  1. Gilderhus, Mark. Democracy and Revolution: U.S.-Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1977, p 1.
  2. Gily, Adolfo. The Mexican Revolution. New Press, New York, NY, 2005, p 26.
  3. Eisenhower, John. Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution 1913-1917. Norton Company, New York, NY, 1993, p 33.
  4.  Ibid., p 37.
  5. Ibid, p 54.
  6. Clendenen, Calrence. The United States and Pancho Villa: A study in Unconventional Diplomacy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1961, p 77.
  7. Ibid, p 84.
  8. Ibid, p 206.
  9. Haley, Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970, p 225.
  10.  Eisenhower, p 328.

Monday, March 7, 2011

Qaddafi on the brinks: The Struggle in Libya

The struggle in Libya is taking a dramatic turn, turning into a spheres of influence war. Zionist arming pro-Qaddafi thugs in order to prevent Libya from becoming a "Islamic state", sections of the Libyan rebels arguing for foreign intervention and on a rampage against Chinese and Somalian immigrants, Qaddafi has built a police state in Tripoli and is continuing to gun/bomb the rebels and yet the Benghazi council and the Libyan National Transitional Council is showing the way: "We are against any foreign intervention or military intervention in our internal affairs ...This revolution will be completed by our people." 
The struggle in Libya is only a link in the chain from all the other struggles occurring in the Middle East and North Africa. Libyan's are facing a police state, a ruling wealthy elite around Qaddafi, and the similar economic hardships faced by their brothers and sisters in Egypt and Tunisia. This is something Qaddafi surely understood, which is why he could express his regret for the fate of his buddy Ben Ali. The U.S. war machine wants Libya bad, there's no hiding that, and there exist sections of the opposition movement that are willing to work with the U.S. and other more honest sections who are calling for limited involvement but no ground troops. We should argue against both. However, this does not de-legitimize the mass rebelling taking place and there cause of a free Libya. We should understand that the U.S. is already negotiating with sections of the ruling elite around Qaddafi, and they are simply hoping for a 'Libya Qaddafi without Qaddafi' The real threat to imperialism isn't in Qaddafi, but in a revolutionary struggle to overthrow him.

Saturday, March 5, 2011

The Arab Spring and the return of Revolution

Revolution is back and it is heating things up. The revolution that started in Tunisia in late December, which toppled Ben Ali, spread to Egypt, which has done away with Hosni Muburak and is now unleashing its wrath in Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and even Iraq. That the Middle East and North Africa is the location of 21st century's first revolutions should come as no surprise to anyone. However, the extent to which this will alter the trajectory of the global economy, U.S. imperialism, and international class struggle is still being determined as I write.

The Middle East has been at the center of world political and economic affairs since the end of World War II. It's strategic geopolitical position and abundance in oil have made it a vital link in the chain of the world economy. In fact in the last three decades world recessions can trace their roots back to the Middle Eastern oil market, just think the Arab oil embargo in 72, Iranian Revolution of 79 or Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 90. A revolution in the Middle East, therefore, will have tremendous economic consequences, and in turn social and political repercussions.

The uprising in the Arab world has three underlying causes,

1) the global recession: The effects of the global recession have been devastating to countries all across the Middle East. Unemployment is extremely high, in Tunisia the unemployment rate is at 14 percent, and the number rises when we speak of the young, who have in the most cases played leading roles in the revolt. Moreover, in the last three decades the Middle East has seen its demographic change dramatically. In Egypt for example half of the population is under 25, while 36 percent is between the ages of 15-35. Neoliberalism and the rein of the free market has gutted social spending and lowered the working class' living standards through privatization. The rise of food prices is also at the heart of the global recession do to the increasing rise of commodities.
2) the lack of democracy and political freedoms: When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 to "liberate" Iraqis no one felt more anger and rage then the people of the Middle East. The earning for real freedom was always there, but not in the hands of an invading army. You have a region filled with regimes that have lasted well over decades (Ben Ali 81, Mubarak 81, Qaddafi 69, or the various kingdoms of Bahrain, Saudia Arabia), but all these regimes apparently didn't make U.S.'s "liberation" cut. The hypocrisy was plain to see and it fueled many since, especially after the people of Gaza exercised their democratic right to elect Hamas, only to be strangled by Israel.
3) the crisis of U.S. imperialism: The U.S. is stuck in the quagmire of Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel is still trying to recover mentally from its defeat in the hands of Hizbollah and is in the middle of an intense cyber war with Iran's nuclear computer programming system. But the fact that the most of the regimes in the Middle East could not show an inch of solidarity with the people of Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine proved that the interest of people from below needed to be exerted, and that these old men needed to be done away with.

Thus you have a revolt demanding, jobs, food, democracy, and to a certain extent a mass rejection of U.S. influence in the region, politically, economically and militarily.

The Arab spring is young, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolution is still in transition. Iran has jailed most opposition leaders. Saudia Arabia is diverting 36 billion dollars in oil revenue for social spending. Bahrain's Khalifa and the U.S. Navy fifth fleet their is still a source of mass discontent. Libya is caught in a civil war, between Qaddafi and the rebel forces, some who are wrongfully arguing for outside intervention. The factors are still at play and more importantly the working class has begun to see its power. This should guarantee a very hot summer. Welcome back Revolution!

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

France in Revolt: The Struggle Against Austerity Politics

i.                     The politics of austerity and the continuing crisis of capital

France is once again at the center stage of class struggle in Europe. Sarkozy is implementing a “reform” to the pension system, which would allow retired workers to collect their pension at 62, as opposed to 60, and collect full benefits at 67, as opposed to 65. This is a direct attack on the living standards of French workers and is part of a strategy to strengthen neoliberalism all across Europe, and in the world really. Talk of “fiscal consolidation”, “debt reconsolidation” and of “shared sacrifices” has surfaced in Europe, in particular in recent months in Britain and in Greece. The same could be said here in the U.S. as politicians are beginning to start an offensive on the Social Security System and candidate for N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo has promised to slash wages and state jobs. The ideas behind these attacks are to make working class people pay for the Great Recession caused by the bankers and the rich. These aggressive attacks are a neoliberal solution to the crisis, i.e. privatization, cuts on social spending, and a general attack on workers living standards.  Throughout the world, the talk has been between a double dip recession and the quagmire of the first. IMF reports that in the U.S. 7.5 million people since 2007 have been added to the unemployment roll. Furthermore, they report, “over 210 million people across the globe are estimated to be unemployed at the moment, an increase of more than 30 million since 2007. Three quarters of the increase in the number of unemployed people has occurred in the advanced economies and the remainder among emerging market economies.” Capitalism stills finds itself in a crisis of overproduction and has no sign of emerging out of its slump unless it is in the back of workers.

ii.                     Sarkozy vs French workers & the left

It’s in this context that we can understand the struggle unfolding in France. Sarkozy’s stubborn attempt to reform the pension system is part of France trying to reshape and to make more competitive its working class for an ever increasing globalized economy. In 2005, former PM Chirac signed a law which would make it easier for bosses to hire and fire workers under 26, effectively creating a two-tier system of workers in France. This was met with the same ferocity as today’s protesters, and was ultimately defeated. Today’s struggle in France partially comes out of the struggles to defeat Chirac’s attempt at “reform”. But more importantly, France has a strong tradition of militant unionism and has a strong left wing tradition. With the activism of large parties like the Socialist Party, Communist Party, and the more revolutionary New Anti-Capitalist Party (NPE), a leftwing alternative to politics of austerity can be provided.

The struggle in France has reached every sector of the population, over 70% of  France support the striking workers and student. The struggle has spread across major cities like Paris and Marseilles into smaller towns across the country. And the waves of strikes haven’t been just through unionized and public sector workers, but through the privatized sector workers, non-unionized workers, and millions of youth. Also true Sarkozy’s popularity level is at its lowest, at around 25%. This is important, considering that just several months ago Sarkozy’s government was going after Roma immigrants and the rights of Arabs and Muslims but yet still had broad public support. This isn’t to say that over night French society reached left-wing conclusions, but it goes to show when workers struggle and are forced to unite, class consciousness rises and backward ideas meet reality. No longer are immigrants or Arabs seen as the enemy, but the enemy is the government that is going after your pensions and living standards. It also goes to show what happens when a clear left-wing alternative to austerity measures are articulated. French workers could have taken this “reform” lying down, but a clear strategy of class struggle unionism and street democracy presented by the revolutionary left and by rank-file union leaders were able to sway French society.

iii.                   Looking Forward
Our solution to the crisis is by not paying national debts, nationalizing the banks, introducing capital controls, programs of public investment and in the long-term, replacing the profit system, with a system based on workers democracy and workers needs. Sarkozy’s pension bill has already passed the senate and will soon arrive on his desk for signing. The ruling class of France has learned their lesson with the Chirac fiasco back in 2005, never give an inch to street democracy. However, if the pressure continues from oil workers, transportation workers, dock workers, nurses, teachers and students, Sarkozy will most likely be pressured to save France’s business image in the world market. However, the main unions of France C.F.D.T and the C.G.T have been dialoguing with the president and there already have been promises of discussing the pension bill on a later date once it has been in effect. This would be an obvious defeat. We should reject dialogue with Sarkozy, and continue the pressure from below, on the streets, in the factories, in the universities, and in the docks of France. Sarkozy has already lost his aspiration of running for presidency in the next year, the popular struggle needs to continue to put the pressure, and also link arms with their brothers and sisters across Europe facing similar attacks. Sarkozy can be forced to drop the bill but workers need to keep the pressure up.